



# The Improvement of U.S. Air Force Cyber Defense

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# Who am I?



- Legacy pilot: Active Duty, AF Reserves, Airlines
- AF Cyber College, 5 years
  - 4 years, military
  - Last year, civilian professor
  - Teaching MDTs, CPTs, cyber fundamentals to non-cyber career fields
- Converted over to 17D, Cyberspace Operations
  - AFSOC/A6
  - Stood up MDTs and Cyber Defense Correlation Cell
- Currently AF Reserve C-130 Vice Wing Commander
- Future: Air University's Blue Horizons Master's Program





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


# Where we are at



- 2016: Cyber Squadron Initiative
  - Mission Defense Team Creation
- 2016: NDAA 1647
  - CROWS, AFOTEC, CPT assessments
- 2018: ACC takes over AF Cyber
- 2018: Enterprise IT as a Service
- 2019: 16 AF combines 24/25 AF
- 2022: 84+ MDTs
- 2023: 19 MDTs funded (kinda)
- 2024: who knows

**What happened?**





# Cyber Framework



	Traditional Info Technology	Operational Technology	Platforms
Mission Level			
System Level			
Component Level			

*Historically have been:*

*Comm Squadron*

*Civil Engineer Squadron*

*Maintenance Squadron*



# What happened?




- **Active Defense**

- We gave it to the wing commanders to own

- No formal education
- Not aware: wing has an MDT or what they do

- **Mission Defense Teams**

- Put them in MSG and Comm Squadrons initially
  - Additional duties, trouble tickets, no operational education
- No expectation or timeline to IOC or FOC
- No Formal Training Unit for an operational team
  - Communicators are normally Maintainers of the Network
  - Any operator takes 2 years to make
- Not funded or billeted
- No return on investment across the teams
  - Couple of slivers of hope, 10% ROI best case





# What can we do?



- **Active Defense**

- Secret sauce for the MDT:


- Leadership buy-in
- Wing mission integration: Ops, MX, Intel, MDT

- COA 1: Give authority back to ACC

- Hold teams accountable: 2 years to become FOC and show ROI

- COA 2: Educate, Integrate, Operate

- Educate wing commanders, not the job of the MDT
- Educate MDTs with AF missions (FTU) and wing missions (MQT)
- Integrate MDTs with wing exercises and deployments
- Integrate PMO/SPO authorities with their weapon system MDTs
- Operationalize MDTs
  - Risk assessments, prioritization, implementation, coordination






# What happened?



- Resiliency
  - Misunderstanding of mission and risk
    - Risk = Threat acting upon Vulnerability
      - Includes consequence and likelihood
    - Risk assessment must involve entire system of systems
      - Server vs. HVAC upgrade
    - Vulnerabilities aren't always acted upon
      - Intel not included in decision-making/prioritization
  - Never delegated PMO/SPO authorities
    - CSAF Action Order B: Bureaucracy







# What can we do?




## • Resiliency

### – Understand mission first then risk to mission

- Understand mission path (system of systems)
- Fuse MDT, Ops, MX, Intel into risk assessment
  - Know your enemy
    - » China: IP theft
    - » Russia: Disruption (don't draw early conclusions from Ukraine)
  - Know your systems
    - » 30 yr HVAC could be more of vulnerability than 5 yr server
- Leaders own risk; support teams advise risk
  - Feed them information, prioritize, execute
  - Trade space to understand risk & where to take risk or improve systems

### – Acquisitions and Weapon System Authorities

- Integrate teams, risk assess, appropriately delegate
  - Pivot faster than the enemy





# What happened?



- **Defense in Depth**

- **Technology isn't the answer**

- Zero Trust
- Blockchain

- **Can't divest it all**


- EITaaS can't cover it all (classifications) and it's too expensive currently

- **Know your enemy**

- Works by heuristics, AI/ML will not save the day

- **Better yet: know your troops**

- Compliance, insider threat vs. negligent user
- No education revolution
  - MX hygiene that isn't implemented or many know about





# What can we do?



- Defense in Depth

- Understand outcomes then match technology to it


- Don't chase it: form follows function

- Enemy heuristics

- Better integration of DODIN, NOS, Comm Sq with EITaaS
  - Divide and conquer contract with military (money balance)
  - Divide and conquer with overlapping fields of fire (delegate)
  - Comm Squadrons will have to stay linked at hip with MDTs

- Education

- Very cheap
  - Hygiene: change it up (Awareness 100, 200, 300, 400 series)
  - Classified education on risk to mission
  - Compliance (more importantly, why are they complying...mission failure)






# Parting thoughts



- MDTs are for mission effectiveness not just cyber defense
  - AFSOC, 1 SOCS, AC-130J mission prep
    - Aircrew got efficiencies (less weight); MDT got effectiveness (less attack surface)
  - AFRC, 94 AW, C-130 tactical datalink
    - Fusion of entire team of teams, everybody got something out of it
  - AMC, 22 CS, mission & risk prioritization
    - Discovery of key nodes when entire wing got involved with assessment
    - Knew network so well without toolkit utilization
- Educate, Integrate, Operate
  - With any new capability involves understanding first
  - Slow is smooth, smooth is fast
    - Cyber TTX, 94 AW, creation of CP checklists
- Capture lessons learned but it must be seen by all
  - A2, 3, 4, 6
  - Information is there, but leadership must prioritize/integrate cyber defense mission





# QUESTIONS



Improving cyber  
operations with  
thinking, not things.