



Evaluating the Resiliency of Artificial Intelligence (AI) Systems: An Overview of Adversarial AI

Cybersecurity and Information Systems Information Analysis Center (CSIAC) Webinar

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
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Purpose



To provide an overview of adversarial artificial intelligence (AI), which encompasses algorithmic and mathematical approaches to degrade, deny, deceive, and/or manipulate AI systems.





Outline




- Al System Resiliency
- Countermeasures and Adversarial Al
- Adversarial Al Access Paradigms
- Adversarial Al Attacks
- System-Level Counter-Al Defense
- Algorithmic Counter-Al Defenses
- Counter-Al Analysis
- Counter-Al Assessment Examples
- Counter-Al Tool
- Adversarial Robustness Toolbox Demo
- Summary
- Q&A



Al System Resiliency





In order to ensure Department of Defense AI systems are safe, secure, and robust, we will fund research into AI systems that have a lower risk of accidents; are more resilient, including to hacking and adversarial spoofing; demonstrate less unexpected behavior; and minimize bias...


...we will pioneer and share novel approaches to testing, evaluation, verification, and validation, and we will increase our focus on defensive cybersecurity of hardware and software platforms as a precondition for secure uses of Al.

 Adversarial AI – Countermeasures that adversaries may deploy against our AI systems and the evaluation steps and defenses needed to safeguard performance.



Al System Resiliency





- Modern AI systems can enhance end-to-end DoD mission capability.
- In order for Al systems to be integrated into the DoD mission space, it must be shown to be resilient.
- Resilient Al systems are robust and secured against identified methods of adversarial attack.



Countermeasures and Adversarial Al



Traditional Human Countermeasures



Deceptions (e.g., social engineering, malicious computing) to deliver hidden payloads



Camouflage, disguises, and fabrications to evade detection or distract



Forgery and data manipulation

Emerging AI Countermeasures (Adversarial AI) Engineered Graffiti Information Operations Model Physical Dynamics by Sampling Varying Distances/Angles Eykholt et al., 2018 Kumar et al., 2017 **Targeted Transformations** Membership/Attribution from Model Shokri et al., 2017 Fredrikson et al., 2014 Engstrom et al., 2018


Al countermeasures have similar goals to traditional countermeasures (e.g., evading detection) but are engineered specifically to defeat Al capabilities.



Adversarial Al Access Paradigms




Example Access Methods




"White Box" Paradigm

Adversary has access to model internals (e.g., weights, gradients)




- Adversary determines underlying open-source elements used in model development
- Adversary recovers model details via unauthorized access to code base, code decompilation, etc.



"Black Box" Paradigm

Adversary able to examine model inputs and outputs, but has no access to internal parameters

- Adversary captures access-limited hardened device with embedded analytics
- Adversary targets remote system with API that permits repeated I/O probing



"Hidden Box" Paradigm


Adversary has no direct access to model, only assumptions about model training or behavior

 Adversary predicts blue force surveillance tactics and surmises underlying AI infrastructure



Adversarial AI Attacks







System-Level Counter-Al Defenses



Adversarial Attack Class

	Poisoning	Evasion	Model Inversion	
	 Sensible data sampling Comparison to previously trained classifiers Dark launching Backtesting Golden dataset 	 Prevent information leakage Limit probing Ensemble learning Adversarial training Adversarial Al incident response plan 	 Differential privacy (privacy budget) Private learning (PATE) Incorporation of randomized response data 	
	 Feedback authentication 	 Input conditioning 		
	Source attribution	 Anomaly detection 		

- Adversarial attacks are well within the capability of a well-resourced adversary to mount.
- If they do think about resiliency, most AI developers think about robustness to expected input, not resiliency to adversarial data, input, or probing (security).
- As Al adoption grows, adversarial Al will have major implications for human-machine teaming, system security, response processes, and data privacy.

Effective defense will require integration of counter-Al techniques with underlying Al algorithms as well as system-level monitoring of Al status.



Algorithmic Counter-Al Defenses



Technique	Key Idea	Integration Point	Attack Class	Attacker Access
Gradient Hiding ¹	Gradient of model is nontrivial or very hard to determine (e.g., non-differentiable, discontinuous)	Algorithm Architecture	Evasion	White box and Black box
Differential Privacy ²	Introducing randomization (e.g., noise) during computation reduces ability of attacker to infer training data	Algorithm Architecture	Inversion	White box and black box
Defensive Distillation ¹	Also known as label smoothing or soft label that converts true class labels into soft values	Algorithm Training	Evasion	Black box
Null Labeling ¹	Create "null" class for samples perturbed beyond expected variation	Algorithm Training	Evasion	White box and black box
Data Sanitization ³	Examine full training dataset and work to remove poisoned points (e.g., deleting outliers)	Algorithm Training / Supply Chain	Poison	White box and Black box
Adversarial Training ¹	Build immunity to adversarially crafted examples by including adversarial examples in training data	Algorithm Training	Poison and Evasion	White box
Integrity Constraints ³	Leverage a separate domain model (e.g., language model) to enforce training data integrity (or input integrity)	Algorithm Training / System Input	Poison and Evasion	White box and Black box
MagNet ¹	Train detectors that distinguish normal and adversarial examples based on distance from normal example manifold	System Input	Evasion	Black-box
Defense-GAN¹	Correlate noise input to generator output using real example to bound generator output range and reduce perturbations	System Input	Evasion	White box and black box

¹Chakraborty et al., "Adversarial Attacks and Defenses: A Survey," 2018

² Abadi et al., "Deep Learning with Differential Privacy," 2016

³ Steinhardt et al., "Certified Defenses for Data Poisoning Attacks," 2017




Counter-Al Analysis



Objective: Analyze impact of black box evasion attacks on face recognition Al system

Reference Image





Input Image






Face recognition successfully matches to reference images

Face recognition
 algorithms have shown
 substantial improvement
 because of use of specially
 designed neural networks.





Objective: Analyze impact of black box evasion attacks on face recognition Al system




- Face recognition algorithms have shown substantial improvement because of use of specially designed neural networks.
- Like many capabilities based on machine learning, these techniques are vulnerable to adversarial attacks.

Face recognition fails to detect matches due to attack






Objective: Analyze impact of black box evasion attacks on face recognition Al system



- Face recognition
 algorithms have shown
 substantial improvement
 because of use of specially
 designed neural networks.
- Like many capabilities based on machine learning, these techniques are vulnerable to adversarial attacks.
- Counter-Al analysis can assess how performance of a face recognition Al system degrades when challenged with different attack scenarios.









Question: How viable are Black-Box transfer attacks, in which the adversary lacks access to any information about the deployed model?





Facial Recognition Performance





Attacks have substantial impact on performance, even though the proxy model structure and training data are different from the actual model.


Counter-Al Assessment Details

- Evaluation uses two distinct neural network architectures trained to predict facial similarity
 - ResNet50 architecture treated as deployed model
 - DenseNet121 architecture treated as adversary's proxy model
 - Both architectures trained on disjoint partitions of VGG Face 2 training set
- Attacks generated on DenseNet121 using FGSM and then transferred to ResNet50
- Results measured over 100,000 image pairs





Situational Awareness of the Information Environment



Mission Challenges

- Developing and maintaining situational awareness of information environment
- Determining sentiment and behavior of target populations
- Communicating developed understanding in support

Al Objectives

- Summarization, entity analysis via natural language processing (NLP)
- Ingestion and fusion of large scale collected publically available information
- Modeling diverse target populations and propaganda effect upon them
- Visualization of information environment supporting operator understanding


Al support maintenance of Mission Information Support Operations (MISO) situational awareness, a critical first step in effective operations





Adversary Objectives

- Confuse Blue Force, hinder ability to develop accurate situational awareness
- Avoid detection and attribution of targeted, malicious information operations activity



Counter-Al Attacks

- Text modification via space insertion, character deletion, visual swap, context-aware word swap
- Leverage automation (e.g., sock puppets) to mask nefarious activity

Potential Countermeasures


- Integrity checking of data (e.g., spell checking to remove misspellings), etc.: 74% attack reduction
- Adversarial training on perturbed examples: 83% attack reduction
- Identification and removal of bot-generated data

Observations

- Al role in MISO is as decision-support tool
- Training and operational data external to the algorithm
- Adversarial activity may be hard to distinguish from normal traffic
- Proxy model development may be difficult due to "hidden-box" nature of environment







Mission Challenges

- Making sense of and detecting malicious events in voluminous, noisy cyber traffic
- Understanding relationship between mission and cyber data "mission mapping"
- Prioritizing and responding to detected malicious activity

Al Objectives

- Anomaly detection algorithms for structured and unstructured network/host data
- Risk assessment in support of event alert ranking
- Course-of-action suggestion based network posture


Al capabilities support feed-forward cyber sensemaking process





Adversary Objectives

- Confuse Blue Force, hinder ability to create correct network map
- Avoid detection and attribution of malicious network/host activity



Adversarial Attacks

- Embed variations in normal network activity used to construct baseline
- Use variations to mask attack anomalies
- Learn (and avoid) high risk alerts

Recommended Defenses

- Data sanitization of baseline traffic to remove attacks
- Adversarial training to enable robust detection
- Leverage differential privacy methods to hide data

Observations

- Cyber sensemaking leverages AI as a decision support tool, with human-in-the-loop
- Cyber data evolves quickly, requiring new collections or data generation
- Proprietary commercial capabilities may be challenging to evaluate
- Proxy model development may be involved due significant data preprocessing of network data
- Cyber attacks enable broad attack considerations



Counter-Al Assessment Considerations



In addition to the two counter-Al assessment examples, here are some general considerations for evaluating Al system resiliency:


- Strong mission interface is a necessity to understand AI system context and threat concerns.
- Commonality across AI systems warrants a common process, infrastructure, and attack/defense capabilities.
- Al systems differ in their primary attack surface as physical vs. digital domain, necessitating modeling and simulation based data generation.
- Not all Al systems have strong counter-Al considerations.
- Al capabilities are provided by cooperative and noncooperative entities (e.g., commercial), impacting assessment activities.



Counter-Al Tool



Al Engineering: DevSecOps for Al Systems






Adversarial Robustness Toolbox Demo



- Adversarial Robustness Toolbox (ART) is a Python library for ML security. ART provides tools that enable
 developers and researchers to evaluate, defend, certify, and verify ML models and applications against the
 adversarial threats.
- ART supports the most popular **ML frameworks** (TensorFlow, Keras, PyTorch, MXNet, scikit-learn, XGBoost, LightGBM, CatBoost, GPy, etc.), many **data types** (images, tables, audio, video, etc.) and numerous **ML tasks** (classification, object detection, generation, certification, etc.).
- ART supports 39 attack modules, 29 defense modules, and 5 metrics for robustness/certification/verification.
- This involves certifying and verifying model robustness and model hardening with approaches such as:
 - Pre-processing inputs
 - Augmenting training data with adversarial examples
 - Leveraging runtime detection methods to flag potentially modified inputs





Useful Weblinks:

https://adversarial-robustness-toolbox.org/

https://adversarial-robustness-toolbox.readthedocs.io/en/latest/

https://github.com/Trusted-Al/adversarial-robustness-toolbox



Adversarial Robustness Toolbox Demo (cont.)



FGSM Evasion Attack Example Using MNIST

The tutorial demonstrates a simple example of using the Adversarial Robustness Toolbox (ART) with Keras. The example trains a convolutional neural network (CNN) model on the classic MNIST dataset (a large dataset of handwritten digits) and creates adversarial examples using the Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) as an evasion attack. This evasion attack, which perturbs the MNIST image pixels, reduces the CNN classifier performance (accuracy) by over 60%. In [1]: # Import the required packages import tensorflow as tf tf.compat.v1.disable eager execution() import warnings warnings.simplefilter(action='ignore', category=Warning) import keras from keras.models import Sequential from keras.layers import Dense, Flatten, Conv2D, MaxPooling2D import numpy as np import matplotlib.pyplot as plt from art.attacks.evasion import FastGradientMethod from art.estimators.classification import KerasClassifier from art.utils import load mnist In [2]: # Step 1: Load the MNIST dataset and display the 4th digit (as an example) (x_train, y_train), (x_test, y_test), min_pixel_value, max_pixel_value = load_mnist() digit = x train[4]plt.imshow(digit, cmap=plt.cm.binary) plt.show() 15

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Adversarial Al. ipynb

Adversarial Al.html



Summary



Al systems hold great promise for enhancing current military, homeland defense, and national security missions; however, adversarial attacks may limit their effectiveness.

A general taxonomy and background on adversarial Al were provided.

Developed Al systems need to be assessed against potential adversarial Al attacks to make them secure and robust in mission context.

The DoD is working to evaluate developed Al systems, identifying promising mitigations that make them resilient to adversarial attacks.

- Interface with mission partners to understand context of AI system deployment
- Assess performance against relevant state-of-the-art adversarial AI attacks
- Recommend mitigations to minimize effect of the adversarial AI attacks
- Provide expertise of adversarial Al attacks and defenses, repository of state-of-theart software, and persistent infrastructure for Al system testing and evaluation



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Q&A



